Monday, December 11, 2006

Women's experiences reconstructing Democracy and Obligation

Early on children are taught if you do not follow the rules thrn consequences will follow. Tthis is no different from government control. If you run a red light, fail to pay your taxes or child support, the ending result is heavy fines by the government. In fact, the experiences of women have displayed that concepts such as Democracy and Obligations lack centrality. which proves to limit the scope and effectiveness of governments to serve the people. Our experiences show that many of the things perceived as voluntary are in fact enforced, concepts lack centrality and represent the experience of men pushing women into the private sphere, and key ideas of human connectedness or relationships are perceived as less effective than individual freedom. Jane Mansbridge, in her essay ``Reconstructing Democracy,'' addresses how women's experience reconstruction of Democracy as Persuasion makes the concept more inclusive, allow women to move freely within the public sphere, and overall strengthen the notion of Democracy. Nancy Hirschman focuses on how women's experiences of care and human connectedness warrant support for reconstructing obligation to include given obligation.

Democracy as power includes sanction or force, but Mansbridge demonstrates Democracy as Persuasion (tool primarily of women) as an alternative, but a necessary form of exercising democracy. Mansbridge provides support for Democracy as Persuasion as an experience of women with the help of Hannah Mather Crocker who ``stated female emphasis on connection coincided with and undoubtedly stemmed in part from women's historical position of powerlessness.''(Mansbridge p.119) It is important to understand that persuasion is a form or tool of women connecting with others in a non-forceful or threatening manner. ``Women have had less access than men to the resources for threatening sanctions or exerting force and both women and men have attributed women a greater capacity for interpersonal sensitivity, so women have often considered the arts of persuasion particularly their own. (Mansbridge p.120) In the position of powerlessness in terms of sanctions or force motivates women to use their own influential qualities to strive for political economic and social equality.

However, the use of persuasion in Democracy is not only good for women, but also improving the meaning and perception of the concept. Democracy ought to exemplify common good, justice, and equality yet its traditional form embarks visions of threats or sanction. The American Heritage Dictionary defines persuade as ``to prevail on (a person) to do something, as by advising or urging'' (Dictionary.com) The definition inherently implies cooperation, understanding, and non-forceful, because power by threat of physical or economic harm is absent. The definition also includes the word advising, which is most likely the position of someone who is trusted, understanding, or whom values cooperation. This is the goal of Democracy as Persuasion, using trust, understanding, and advising to make just outcomes.

Democracy as Persuasion includes consultative leadership with a primary focus on Democratic Deliberation and ongoing relationships that reconstruct Democracy with just outcomes focusing on common good and shared goals and interest. ``An analysis of many studies on leadership concludes that in the contemporary United States women are more likely than men to adopt a ``consultative'' style of leadership. This style as Marlene Dixon suggested, accords serious value of listening.'' (Mansbridge p.123) Because the concept of Authority is gender biased, which makes it difficult for women to be viewed as hierarchical leaders, women adopted the consultative style of leadership with focus on active listening. Many women who had the qualities of consultative style of leadership are confined to the private sphere in respect of decision making because they do not exemplify the common exercise of democracy as sanction or threat. However, this is detrimental to the concept of Democracy and women.

What is consultative style of leadership and how can it help us positively reconstruct Democracy? The Consultative style of leadership is exercising Democratic Deliberation with attention to ongoing relationships. ``Consultative democratic deliberation would require men as well as women develop the conscious practice of emotional empathy, a characteristic coded as female.'' (Mansbridge p.124) Empathizing with someone else's circumstances diminishes the difference between you and another person, which ultimately help individuals to further the good of all because they imagine themselves in the position of another. When you empathize, you see yourself no more different from the next person, which make it easier to see the shared goals and interests between the two. Early on we are taught emotion in decision-making is bad and only rationality is the appropriate way for settling disputes. ``Democratic theorist, perhaps influenced by the enduring coding of ``emotion as female'' and ``reason as male'', think of deliberation only as ``reasoned deliberation'', making its emotional components illegitimate or leaving them unexplored.'' (Mansbridge p. 125) The concept of Democracy is decentralized because emotion has been excluded in the practice because it was encoded as female. Until empathy is including into democracy, it will remain a term bias to the experience of women to empathize. Many believe that emotion distorts the facts or cognitive ability of the decision maker, however, Mansbridge warns that this should not be the case and ``Deliberation and deliberate appeals for the public good require an emotional and cognitive probing of one's own feeling of empathy, admiration, revulsion, or horror.'' (Mansbridge p. 125) Empathy furthers common good and just outcomes help others to see each other as different from norms, but not so different you cannot empathize with their circumstances.

Consultative Democratic Deliberation pays special attention to ongoing relationships. Women's concern for human relationship presumes that there are ongoing relationships between groups as well as individuals. (Mansbrige p.124) This presumption of ongoing relationships as Mansbridge describes should consider the worth of both parties. (Mansbridge p. 124) Focusing soley ongoing relationships with narrow visions only take into account current conflicts, which increase the likelihood of decisions that protect one group and leave the other vulnerable. Behind human relationships lie historical factors and conditions, which looking at one dispute and rendering a decision cannot suffice. Women's experiences on human relationship do the opposite and increase the likelihood of just outcomes for the common good.

Hirschman rejects obligation contingent on consent as being the only way to develop obligation mainly because it is decentralized and only fit the norms of men. Traditional and Contemporary theorist place importance on individuals, rather than human connectedness that is how they establish consent as an acceptance of obligation. Emphasis on care and human connectedness are excluded from the structure of traditional concept of obligation and it is exactly this that Hirschman attempts to change. Yet, she does not reject consent and voluntarism as legitimate forms of accepting obligations, but she argues that nonconsensual obligation is necessary to decentralize the concept of obligation. (Hirschman p.162)

Human connectedness and relationships are usually the primary experience of women yet, historically they have been excluded. ``What is at issue once again is the exclusive focus on rights and rules as ``the'' voice of morality and denigration of voice of care as women's historical mode of orientation. `` (Hirschman p.167) Historically caretaking have been the primary jobs or responsibility of women, which consist of the caring and connectedness. Although caring and connectedness is not biologically determined, socially it has been reinforced as something that only women should do. (Hirschman p.164) Women have lacked access to power as domination and historically have had a hard time establishing the same requirements and duties for men of caretaking. Yet, although women have had more of an experience of care and human connectedness, the definition of obligation excludes that aspect, while only representing the male experience of individual rights, freedom, choice, and consent. (Hirschman p.167) As a result, many of the responsibilities of women that could be defined as fulfilling an obligation are excluded because the definition includes individual rights, freedom, choice, and consent but excludes care and connectedness. ``Throughout history women have been forced to ``consent'' to marriage, to motherhood, and to activities, work, and roles that these have entailed for different classes and races of women.'' (Hirschman p.160)

What can the women's experience of care in regards to raising children tell us how to reconstruct Obligation? This is very important as over the course of many years women have not seen marriage, motherhood, and activities as an obligation they made by choice or consented. Yet, just because historically that was the case, today there are many women who perform these particular tasks as a reinforcement of social norms and it is not a voluntary choice they consent, but rather a means of ``given'' obligation for caretaking. Hirschman also discusses women's lack of choice of deciding whether they want a baby due to lack of access to abortion or birth control. However, it is still considered their obligation to take care of their children although they did not consent to it. Therefore, in this case, women did not consent, but taking care of their children is still considered an obligation.

Since it is possible for women to have obligation without consenting, Hirschman argues that nonconsensual obligation should be included within the definition of obligation. Yet, traditional and contemporary theorist will only recognize consent as the only form of accepting an obligation. As a result obligations that women fulfill pertaining to care for family are established as outside the ream of obligations and do not constitute as having importance within the public sphere. (Hirschman-handout p. 183) This does women a great deal of disservice because it forces their obligations into the private sphere and women's experiences are excluded from the concept obligation. ``Consent theorists do not want to explore the implications of private relationships for public ones, because this would require them to compromise the natural liberty they wish to claim for men.'' (Hirschman-handout p.184) When women and their ``obligations'' are deemed private this leaves men at liberty to define what is public based on what is pushed to the private. Hence, this would explain how men's natural liberty to choose is just another method of taking consent away from women, the underlying problem of consent. ``Obligations should be centered around, recognition, conversation, and participatory democracy.'' (Hirschman-handout p. 183) Consent as the only form of recognizing obligations leave no room for given or nonconsensual obligation, which more inadequately expresses the experiences of women.

Secondly, the support of consent as the central factor of determining obligation is dependent on individuality, which is biased toward women's experience. ``Rather than giving obligation the hegemonic priority that freedom has in liberalism, a feminist approach to obligation opens up our injury to see that the notions of individuality and freedom that underlie liberalism are rooted in contexts of relationships.'' (Hirschman p. 171) Hirschman envisions political obligations defined in a matter without so much emphasis on freedom, equality, and individual choice. The terms themselves are essentially contested concepts that many feminist have asserted only represent the experience of men. Hirschman shares this concern with the concept of political obligation and its emphasis on consent. ``Fundamental assumptions of natural freedom and equality that make consent the only possible basis for obligation.'' (Hirschman Pg. 161) However, making consent the only possibility for obligation is contrary to the experiences of women. ``The exaggerated emphasis on consent as the legitimate way to establish relationships of obligation and the assumption of innate human separateness on which it is based, reveal a masculinist conceptualization of the self, of ``individuals,'' that runs contrary to women's experience and epistemology.'' (Hirschman p. 162) Hirschman establishes given obligation as an alternative to consent, which she states that relationship are assumed. (Hirschman p. 171) So, that leaves the question. how is that obligation is to be fulfilled? Establishing that question according to Hirschman automatically starts conversation and negotiation between individuals in their relationship. (Hirschman p.171) Answering this question enables individuals to seem themselves outside the context of self and as a part within a relationship. ``It entails the priority of connection and relationship, enabling us to see that the well-being of others may enhance one's own capacity to act.'' (Hirschman p.185) This is similar to Mansbridge's focus on empathy, which entails probing your emotions to see yourself as part of something larger than the scope of the individual encouraging you to act which ever you like. ``Consent theory entails seeing obligation as individually negotiated contracts between otherwise unconnected individuals.'' (Hirschman p. 172) However, widening the concept of obligation to include human connectedness creates a common good with emphasis on erasing competing interest and perceiving each other as an extension of ourselves.

Surprisingly, although Hirschman and Mansbridge essays were about similar yet distinct political concepts, much of their method of reconstructing the terms were comparable. Both authors begin their essay at the same point, the inherent bias within the political concept of obligation and democracy. Not astonishingly, in addition, the authors' solution to the problem was the difference approach, which embraces the difference of women and attempts to add them to the reconstruction of the political concepts. Much of the authors' focus was on women's experience of care and human connectedness. Mansbridge discusses Democracy as Persuasion includes empathy and human connectedness to relationships, which allow women inclusion if included within the definition of Democracy. Hirschman discusses given obligation and human connectedness as means to counterbalance the traditional decentralized conception of Obligation as consented. However, neither author totally rejects the concept of Democracy as Power or Obligation as Consented, but rather they argue women's experience should be included within those conceptions to centralize their meaning. Before writing this essay I thought there was choice in everything I did, however after reading Mansbridge and Hirschman's essays I understand this is not the case. Whether you are referring to Democracy as Power or Obligation, both authors demonstrate how the traditional concepts are male biased and rob women of choice.

It is evident after analyzing the two essays by Mansbridge and Hirschman that there are illusions of choice, but not the real thing. Whether you discuss Democracy as Power or the notion of Obligation via consent, women's experiences demonstrate the illusion of choice. It is difficult to claim that this is bad or good, but definitely in need of scrutiny. What is fortunate is that women's experiences will continue to decentralize concepts and push our experiences to the public sphere.

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